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By RE~zA DIBADJ*
THE CONVENTIONAL wisdom has been that state law governs the
internal affairs of corporations and federal law governs disclosure. Dis-
tinguished commentators lament Sarbanes-Oxley's ("SOX") I "unprec-
edented intrusions into corporate governance ' 2 and claim that the
"federal regime had until then consisted primarily of disclosure re-
quirements rather than substantive corporate governance mandates,
which were traditionally left to state corporate law."'3 These assertions,
however, have little basis in today's reality.
Contrary to the usual exhortations, SOX is not a watershed: sig-
nificant federal layering has been going on for decades.4 As Mark Roe
has shown in a series of articles, SOX is just the latest in an array of
federal incursions, which include the Securities Act of 1933,5 the Se-
* Associate Professor, University of San Francisco School of Law.
1. For a description of Sarbanes-Oxley, see, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV.
915 (2003); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Du-
ties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1149, 1154 (2004).
2. Jill E. Fisch, The New Federal Regulation of Corporate Governance, 28 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
PoL'Y 39, 42 (2004) [hereinafter Fisch, New Federal Regulation].
3. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Govern-
ance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005) [hereinafter Romano, Quack Governance].
4. As Robert Clark notes, "[t]he SOX-related reforms were not based on a policy
decision to effect a major 'paradigm shift' in the allocation of law making authority be-
tween the federal government and the states." Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Govern-
ance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers
Too 30 (HarvardJohn M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Harvard Law and
Economics Discussion Paper No. 525, Dec. 5, 2005), http://ssm.com/abstract=808244.
5. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 7 7a-77aa (2000)).
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curities Exchange Act of 1934,6 the Williams Act,7 and the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act8 .9 Roe concludes that
in nearly every decade of the twentieth century, the decade's major
corporate law issue either went federal or federal authorities
threatened to take it over-from early twentieth-century merger
policy, to the 1930s securities laws, to the 1950s proxy fights, to the
19 60s Williams Act, to the 1970s going-private transactions.' 0
John Coates sums up the current confusing state of affairs:
Commentators have often noted the odd division of labor between
federal securities law and state corporate law. Federal regulation of
proxies, tender offers, and insider trading are all arguably much
more integral to the substantive relationships among investors,
firms, directors, and managers that are at the heart of corporate
law, than they are to the disclosure-oriented emphasis of the ex-
isting federal securities statutes. On the other hand, cash tender
offers, mergers and recapitalizations involve investment decisions
as important as an initial decision to invest and present similar op-
portunities for fraud and deception."t
Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, a series of layers or "band-
ages" has developed to recover from recurring scandals-much like
an antiquated computer operating system requires downloading
patches to hobble along. 12
Why the layers? Commentators such as Roe suggest that the mere
threat of federal intervention serves as a check on states' powers.' 3 A
more Machiavellian reasoning, however, suggests that the federal gov-
6. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000)).
7. Williams Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (2000)).
8. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1978)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78ff (2000)).
9. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARv. L. REv. 588, 611-16 (2003)
[hereinafter Roe, Delaware's Competition]; MarkJ. Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118 HARv. L. REv.
2491, 2498, 2520-23 (2005) [hereinafter Roe, Delaware's Politics].
10. Roe, Delaware's Politics, supra note 9, at 2498.
11. John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A Political Cost!
Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 531, 577 (2001).
12. See Reza Dibadj, Delayering Corporate Law, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 469 (2005) [herein-
after Dibadj, Delayering Corporate Law].
13. See Roe, Delaware's Politics, supra note 9, at 2499 ("Delaware's freedom to act and its
limits are not determined solely, and perhaps not even primarily, by its strength vis-a-vis
other states, but by the line demarcating where the federal authorities leave it alone and
where they do not."). See also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or
Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE LJ. 553, 558
(2002) ("Our weak-competition account suggest that the greatest threat confronting Dela-
ware is not competition from other states but the possibility that the federal government
will intervene in a way that would undermine Delaware's position."). Delaware is, of course,
the leading jurisdiction for incorporations. See infta notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
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ernment helps maintain the status quo by serving as a buffer that de-
flects attention from what state courts, most prominently in Delaware,
are not doing.14 Regardless of which account one believes, the status
quo provides insufficient protections to shareholders. On the one
hand, layers of regulation exist everywhere; on the other, problems
fester and scandals routinely erupt.
This Article is a first step toward a new approach. Part I argues
that existing proposals-framed around the polarities of dual federal-
ism and preemptive federalism-leave much to be desired. Dual fed-
eralism suffers from a host of implausible assumptions and ignores the
weaknesses of existing state corporate law. For its part, preemptive
federalism assumes that the federal government can do much more to
protect shareholders than is realistic given the institutional constraints
Congress, the SEC, and the federal courts must face.
Part II frames the beginning of a fresh approach drawn from new
research in economic regulation. It proposes that the relationship be-
tween corporations and their shareholders operate within the frame-
work of cooperative federalism using a reverse-Erie framework. It
suggests that the intersection of federalism and securities regulation
may be analyzed along several dimensions, including type of regula-
tory intervention, whether private rights of action should be allowed,
and what the jurisdictional nexus for state intervention might be. It
then makes specific proposals along each dimension. The Article con-
cludes by addressing a number of constitutional issues cooperative
federalism might raise, including the creation of federal common law
by state instrumentalities, as well as possible non-delegation and anti-
commandeering concerns.
14. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Cor-
porate Federalism 2 (European Corporate Governance Institute Law Working Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 23/2004 & Georgetown University Law Center, Business, Economics &
Regulatory Policy Research Paper No. 606481, 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=606481
[hereinafter, Bratton & McCahery, Equilibrium]; Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Our Corpo-
rate Federalism and the Shape of Corporate Law 12 (University of Pennsylvania Law School
Institute for Law and Economics Research Paper No. 04-12 & New York University Law
School Law and Economics Research Paper Series Working Paper No. 04-020, 2004),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=564685 (forthcoming VAND. L. REv.) ("Delaware may favor fed-
eral intervention to the extent that it makes the corporate law system as a whole less scan-
dal prone and reduces the chances of populist backlash against Delaware as principal
regulator. Thus, the relationship between federal and state regulation in corporate law is,
in our view, more symbiotic and less antagonistic than generally presumed.").
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I. Incongruity
Conventional solutions to overcome the ineffectual confusion re-
volve around two polarities: dual federalism and preemptive federal-
ism. Unfortunately, neither provides a workable framework.
A. Dual Federalism
1. Races and Deregulation
One proposal is to devolve securities regulation to the states,
where corporate law ostensibly resides. The most eloquent proponent
of this approach is Roberta Romano, who argues that firms should be
allowed to "select their securities regulator from among the fifty states
and the District of Columbia, the SEC, or other nations."15 She would
thus prefer "a market-oriented approach of competitive federalism
that would expand, not reduce, the role of the states in securities
regulation."1 6
On one level, the argument is quite seductive. After all,
[c]ompetitive federalism harnesses the high-powered incentives of
markets to the regulatory state in order to produce regulatory ar-
rangements compatible with investors' preferences. This is because
firms will locate in the domicile whose regime investors prefer in
order to reduce their cost of capital, and states have financial in-
centives (such as incorporation and registration fees) to adapt
their securities regimes to firms' locational decisions.'
7
Consistent with her work in corporate law, Romano assumes that
such an approach would lead to a "race to the top. s18 The thesis, how-
ever, relies on a host of implausible assumptions, notably that inves-
tors have perfect information and that the corporate form does not
present externalities. Charles Tiebout's hypothetical and perfectly in-
formed citizen-voter is magically assumed to be a real-world investor.19
A little bit of history should drive the point home. Over the past
century, states competed for charters by offering reduced public regu-
15. Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation,
107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2427 (1998) [hereinafter Romano, Market Approach]. See also id. at 2389.
16. Id. at 2361.
17. Id. at 2427.
18. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corpo-
rate Governance?, OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=693484 [hereinafter Romano, Regulatory Competition].
19. See id. at 14 ("States compete for citizens, following Tiebout's celebrated in-
sight."). Charles Tiebout's famous article argues that this hypothetical "consumer-voter
may be viewed as picking that community which best satisfies his preference pattern for
public goods." Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64J. POL. ECON. 416,
418 (1956).
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latory oversight of the corporation. 20 Delaware, of course, has taken
the lead in the quest to attract incorporations. To do so, it has created
a legal regime protective of insiders, leading some critics to label it
"the brothel of corporate law." 2 1 It is unfair, however, to single out
Delaware. AsJill Fisch has pointed out, "state corporation statutes con-
tain relatively little substantive variation. Careful empirical research
reveals that corporate codes tend toward uniformity."2 2 The reason
for this consistency is intimately related to the competition for incor-
porations: state corporate codes must be attractive enough both for
new local companies to incorporate at home rather than bear the ad-
ditional costs of going to Delaware, 23 as well as for existing local cor-
porations to remain in-state rather than reincorporate in Delaware.
24
Lured by contractarianism, corporate law statutes are "ena-
bling."25 Through clever tools such as the business judgment rule, fi-
duciary rules set "standards of review" well below "standards of
conduct."26 They focus on directors, not officers who actually run a
corporation. 27 And the list goes on.28 The bottom line is simple: im-
pressive-sounding obligations can be carefully skirted through clever
process. 29 As Edward Rock suggests in his study of how Delaware cor-
20. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic Analysis,
84 Nw. U. L. REv. 542, 549 (1990) (referring to the process as "chartermongering").
21. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of Corporate Govern-
ance?, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1189, 1189 (2003).
22. Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 1061, 1066 (2000).
23. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 13, at 575 ("[T] he vast majority of firms
that opt for out-of-state incorporation go to Delaware, and firms in each local market are
currently making a choice that is effectively between incorporating in their home state or
in Delaware.").
24. See, e.g., Romano, Regulatory Competition, supra note 18, at 16 (explaining that char-
ter competition is not only about "state officials' actions to induce foreign corporations to
reincorporate from another state" but should also consider "actions to maintain local
firms' domicile in-state").
25. See id. at 11 ("State corporate law is in essence enabling, following a menu ap-
proach that permits firms to alter statutory defaults to fit their needs.").
26. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of
Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 437, 438 (1993).
27. See Robert B. Thompson, Delaware, the Feds, and the Stock Exchange: Challenges to the
First State as First in Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. CoR. L. 779, 781 (2004).
28. For a detailed discussion of the weak shareholder protections that state corporate
law provides, see Dibadj, Delayering Corporate Law, supra note 12.
29. As Delaware Vice Chancellor Leo Strine candidly admits, "Delaware corporate law
generally permits corporate managers wide flexibility and errs on the side of managerial
freedom." Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware's Corporate-Law System: Is Corporate America Buying an
ExquisiteJewel or a Diamond in the Rough? A Response to Kahan & Kamar's Price Discrimina-
tion in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1279 (2001).
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porate law is actually made, "we come much closer to understanding
the role of courts in corporate law if we think of judges more as
preachers than as policemen."'3 0
Predictably, as a fresh batch of scandals began rocking the corpo-
rate world in 2001, state law was conspicuously absent:
But where has Delaware been through all this? No bills have been
introduced in Delaware's legislature; no hearings held by its com-
mittees; its law enforcement agents have taken no action; and its
executives have staid mum. How is it that Delaware-the home of
what has long been viewed as the defacto national corporate law-
has sat on the sidelines?3 1
The problem, of course, is not confined to Delaware.3 2 As Robert
Thompson notes, "the response in state corporate law has been
largely one of silence that has left any modifications in corporate gov-
ernance to ... other actors"3 3; in the end, "no one thought that state
law was the place to address these problems."3 4
In the wake of corporate scandals, Romano has written a strong
rebuke of SOX,3 5 instead suggesting an enabling statute akin to those
in corporate law. 36 Tellingly though, she does not discuss the possibil-
ity that contractarian state corporate statutes and anemic fiduciary du-
ties might have allowed scandals to develop. After all, it would be
difficult to argue that the perpetrators in the recent corporate scan-
30. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44
UCLA L. REv. 1009, 1016 (1997). See also id. at 1067-68 ("As one experienced Wall Street
transactional lawyer put it in private conversation, 'We're not afraid of what the Delaware
courts say. We're afraid of what the press says.'").
31. Kahan & Rock, supra note 14, at 1. See also Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89
CORNELL L. REv. 456, 456-57 (2004).
32. As Stephen Bainbridge reminds us, "the two main poster-children for reform, En-
ron and WorldCom, were not Delaware corporations; they were incorporated in Oregon
and Georgia, respectively." Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate
Law, REG., Spring 2003, at 26, 30.
33. Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Governance After Enron, 40 Hous. L. REv. 99, 102
(2003).
34. Id. at 107.
35. See Romano, Quack Governance, supra note 3, at 1585 ("The SOX corporate govern-
ance mandates were not carefully considered by Congress; in particular, they were not
evaluated in light of the empirical literature questioning their efficacy."). Cf Roberta S.
Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William 0. Douglas-The Securities and Exchange Commission
Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL.J. CoRr. L. 79, 130 (2005) [hereinafter Karmel,
Douglas].
36. See Romano, Quack Governance, supra note 3, at 1529 ("The central policy recom-
mendation of this Article is that the corporate governance provisions of SOX should be
stripped of their mandatory force and rendered optional for registrants.").
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dals were either careful or loyal. 37 Perhaps "the SOX initiatives are not
to be found in any state corporation codes"38 precisely because state
corporation codes have not protected shareholders. 39
Indeed, devolving to simple dual regulation will likely make
things worse, not better, by making Delaware's position even more
prominent than it is today.40 This will exacerbate the existing "demo-
cratic deficit"41 in corporate law, where a small state with approxi-
mately 800,000 citizens enjoys making de facto national law. 42 A cynic
might be forgiven for wondering whether dual federalism could serve
as an apologia for naive deregulation of securities regulation. 43
2. Internal Affairs and Blue Skies
The "internal affairs" doctrine undergirds dual federalist concep-
tions and has fueled the race to deregulate state corporate law. It is
first important to understand what the doctrine is and what it is not.
As the United States Supreme Court describes it,
37. As Robert Thompson and Hillary Sale summarize, "[t]oday's federal securities
fraud claims are largely efforts to recover from what could be care claims at state law."
Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections
upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 904 (2003). See also Kahan & Rock, supra note 14, at
25 (as just one example, noting how looting at Tyco represents a "classic self-dealing trans-
action by a corporate fiduciary").
38. Romano, Quack Governance, supra note 3, at 1528.
39. See Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 775, 806
(2006) ("Federal securities law, not state corporate law, plays the most important role in
corporate governance in America today .. "). Perhaps surprisingly, a case might be made
that securities law violations may constitute such transgressions of corporate law that they
are even beyond the broad protections of the business judgment rule. As former SEC Com-
missioner Harvey Goldschmid observes, "[n]o case, to my knowledge (and I think I know
of each and every one), has been brought [by the SEC] that second-guesses honest busi-
ness decisions of directors or officers." HarveyJ. Goldschmid, The SEC at 70: Let's Celebrate
Its Reinvigorated Golden Years, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 825, 830 (2005).
40. See Romano, Market Approach, supra note 15, at 2391 ("It is, however, probable that
opening securities regulation up to state competition would enhance Delaware's dominant
position as an incorporation state.").
41. Kahan & Rock, supra note 14, at 29.
42. Cf Jerry L. Mashaw & Dylan S. Calsyn, Block Grants, Entitlements, and Federalism: A
Conceptual Map of Contested Terrain, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 297, 311 (1996) ("Our point
thus is only that states in the American union now have complicated and ambiguous rela-
tionships to representative democracy and to ideas of citizen efficacy. One cannot draw the
general conclusion that devolution of all sorts of programs and functions-where that dev-
olution is of power to state government-promotes representative democracy in a federal
polity like ours.").
43. Cf Roberta S. Karmel, Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities Regulation in
the United States and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 495, 496 (2003) [hereinafter Karmel,
Federal and State] ("Some scholars believe that competition among financial regulators is
beneficial and results in an optimum level of regulatory intrusion upon private business
interests. Proponents of this theory frequently are apologists for deregulation.").
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The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which
recognizes that only one State should have the authority to regu-
late a corporation's internal affairs-matters peculiar to the rela-
tionships among or between the corporation and its current
officers, directors, and shareholders-because otherwise a corpora-
tion could be faced with conflicting demands. 44
As one commentator notes, "[w]ithout the internal affairs doc-
trine, a state will be severely restricted in its ability to apply its law to
shareholders, managers, and assets outside of the state of incorpora-
tion. 45 The race to attract corporate charters would cease.46
Theoretically, states would be free to ignore the internal affairs
doctrine and rely on basic conflicts principles. As numerous commen-
tators have pointed out, the doctrine is not constitutionally man-
dated. 4 7 Moreover, the guidance provided by the Restatement of
Conflict of Laws provides space to regulate:
The local law of the state of incorporation will be applied to deter-
mine such issues, except in the unusual case where, with respect to
the particular issue, some other state has a more significant rela-
tionship to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local
law of the other state will be applied.48
Comment g seems to allow even more leeway, observing that
"[s] tatutes in a number of states forbid regulation of the internal af-
44. Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982). For discussions of the internal
affairs doctrine, see Richard M. Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal
Affairs Doctrine in Corporation Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 29 (1987); Deborah A. DeMott, Perspec-
tives on Choice of Law for Corporate Internal Affairs, 48 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161 (1985).
45. Arthur R. Pinto, Takeover Statutes: The Dormant Commerce Clause and State Corporate
Law, 41 U. MIAMi L. REv. 473, 494 (1987) [hereinafter Pinto, Takeover Statutes].
46. See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 14, at 33 ("The continued applicability of the
internal affairs rule is, of course, the life-blood of Delaware."); David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethink-
ing the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. Rav. 471, 521 (1994)
("If choice of law were based not on the state of incorporation, but on some other factor
such as the firm's principal place of business, corporate managers would lose much of
their incentive to shop for the optimal corporation law regime, and the competition for
charters would break down.").
47. See, e.g., Arthur R. Pinto, The Constitution and the Market for Corporate Control: State
Takeover Statutes After CTS Corp., 29 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 699, 764-65 (1988) [hereinafter
Pinto, Corporate Control] ("Although the [United States Supreme] Court historically has
deferred to the law of the state of incorporation on issues involving internal affairs, that
does not mean that the Court has established a constitutional requirement under the com-
merce clause mandating that the law of the state of incorporation be applied on all corpo-
rate governance issues."); Note, The Internal Affairs Doctrine: Theoretical Justifications and
Tentative Explanations for Its Continued Primacy, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1480 (2002) [hereinafter
Note, Internal Affairs] (arguing that neither Due Process, Full Faith and Credit, nor Dor-
mant Commerce Clause analysis compels the internal affairs doctrine).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 302(2) (1971).
[Vol. 40
FEDERALISM IN SECURITIES SYMPOSIUM
fairs of foreign corporations . . . .On the other hand, statutes in other
states specifically provide for such regulation. 49
In fact, one might argue that the internal affairs doctrine makes
for questionable policy. The doctrine is formalistic, especially as ap-
plied to states that host significant portions of a corporation's opera-
tions. 50 The internal affairs doctrine might ensure a uniform law for
the business entity, but the other side of the equation-investor pro-
tection-is ignored. 51 In other words, states might also want to protect
their resident shareholders. As Bernard Black notes, "[a]t the state
level, the best prospect for manager constraining rules is laws whose
force depends on contacts with the state other than incorporation."52
At the margins, some states have recognized that the internal af-
fairs doctrine might elevate form over function. Large states, notably
New York and California, reserve the right to regulate some aspects of
corporations formed out of state as "pseudo-foreign" corporations. 53
Yet these statutes are both rare and rarely enforced. Maybe states
would like to emphasize continuity and consistency. Or perhaps they
cater to business interests and the powerful local bar committees who
draft state corporate laws. 54
49. Id. (Reporter's Note, Comment g) (emphasis added).
50. See, e.g., Pinto, Corporate Control, supra note 47, at 769 ("If anything, a rule automat-
ically applying the law of incorporation to situations in which substantially all the assets and
shareholders and the principal place of business are in one state that is not the state of
incorporation, without any other nexus, would promote form over substance and abandon
any real balancing of interests."); Note, Internal Affairs, supra note 47, at 1488 ("Choosing
the law of the state of incorporation over that of another state with which the corporation
has contacts sufficient to satisfy due process is ultimately arbitrary.").
51. Cf Note, Internal Affairs, supra note 47, at 1487 ("There is a dearth of empirical
data specifically addressing the efficiency implications of the internal affairs doctrine; nev-
ertheless, courts have continued to apply the doctrine, often citing consistency as their
rationale. The persistence of the doctrine suggests that courts typically presume that the
gains corporations accrue exceed any losses individual stockholders may suffer.").
52. Black, supra note 20, at 580. See also Note, Internal Affairs, supra note 47, at 1481
("Forum states have at least two incentives to apply their law to the internal disputes of
foreign corporations: to provide greater protection to resident shareholders and to under-
mine the primacy of Delaware as a state of incorporation.").
53. For negative views of these attempts, see, e.g., William J. Carney, The Production of
Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 715, 759 (1998) [hereinafter Carney, Corporate Law] ("Stat-
utes that preclude vigorous competition, such as those of New York and California that
reduce the benefits of migration by regulating pseudo-foreign corporations, are the real
problem."); P. John Kozyris, Some Observations on State Regulation of Multistate Takeovers-
Controlling Choice of Law Through the Commerce Clause, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499, 519 (1989)
("Cutting through the facade of the foreign incorporation and asserting global authority to
regulate the internal affairs of this entity may constitute a frontal assault on the lex
incorporationis.").
54. See, e.g., Carney, Corporate Law, supra note 53, at 716; Mark J. Loewenstein, The
Quiet Transformation of Corporate Law, 57 SMU L. REv. 353, 384-85 (2004).
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Abiding by the internal affairs doctrine may also be more palat-
able politically. Here, an analogy might be drawn to recent scholar-
ship in criminal law. In his study of the different ways in which
criminal "recidivist [sentence] enhancement and [sex offender] regis-
tration laws take account of out-of-state prior convictions," 5 5 Wayne
Logan has found two approaches among states:
The internal approach requires that out-of-state convictions, and
any punishment resulting from those convictions, satisfy the eligi-
bility requirements of the forum state's registration or recidivist en-
hancement law. The external approach, on the other hand, allows
such decisions to be based on the legal determinations of the fo-
rum state's fellow sovereigns. 5 6
While the analogy is far from perfect, the "external approach" is
akin to abiding by the internal affairs doctrine; the "internal ap-
proach" is not. Interestingly, Logan finds that
the external approach also functions to undermine governmental
transparency and political accountability. By deferring to the laws
of other sovereigns, forum state officials become free riders: they
avoid any possible negative political consequences that might at-
tend enforcement of such laws in the first instance in the fo-
rum . . . . The external approach thus permits jurisdictions to
indulge in a kind of stealth legislation: laws are applied by the fo-
rum without having been subject to the debate and compromise
common to the legislative process. 57
By contrast, "internal approach states can be considered stalwarts
of 'fifty-labs' federalism. By insisting that foreign convictions warrant
recidivist or registration treatment under their own laws, and not de-
ferring to thejudgments of the states where the convictions occurred,
the states reify federalist values of self-governance and autonomy."5 8
State corporate law authorities by and large embrace the "external ap-
proach"-perhaps largely because it is more politically expedient.
In a fascinating irony, however, state attorneys general have be-
come the heroes of the "internal approach" by using state blue sky
laws. Interestingly, this new twist is a historical anomaly. After all, even
the strongest of these statutes, 59 designed to protect investors from
55. Wayne A. Logan, Horizontal Federalism in an Age of Criminal Justice Interconnectedness,
154 U. PA. L. REv. 257, 261 (2005).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 322-23.
58. Id. at 318.
59. Many blue sky statutes, of course, were far from rigorous. See, e.g., Stefania A. Di
Trolio, Public Choice Theory, Federalism, and the Sunny Side to Blue-Sky Laws, 30 WM. MITCHELL
L. REv. 1279, 1290 (2004) ("[M]any of the blue-sky laws were fraught with so many exemp-
tions that they were essentially an illusory protection.").
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unscrupulous securities promoters and traders, 60 have a history of un-
derenforcement and evasion. 61 In the wake of the most recent spate of
corporate scandals, however, several states have dusted off these laws
and begun enforcing them.
There are two major reasons why blue sky laws have become such
a potent weapon. First, they rest on a different jurisdictional basis, ef-
fectively circumventing the internal affairs doctrine by focusing on the
locus of the securities transaction. As one commentator summarizes:
Another enclave somewhat insulated from the lex incorporationis de-
rives from the authority of a state to regulate local transactions in-
volving the securities of foreign corporations wherever they are
incorporated. Traditional wisdom holds that a state should be able
to control the public distribution of all securities within its borders
regardless of the affiliations of the issuing corporations.
62
Second and relatedly, blue sky laws have teeth because they are
mandatory: clever insiders cannot contract out of the law like they can
with ineffectual state corporate codes. Moreover, states in whose juris-
diction significant securities transactions take place-notably New
York, where Wall Street resides-can apply their blue sky laws to a
broader array of corporations. This is precisely why New York's blue
sky law, the Martin Act,6 3 has been such a powerful weapon in Eliot
Spitzer's hands. 64 Jonathan Macey even suggests that the Martin Act
has allowed Spitzer to engineer a coup of sorts:
Mr. Spitzer has not been content to share power with the SEC. He
certainly has not been content to follow the SEC's lead, or to let
the SEC set the regulatory agenda. While Eliot Spitzer is driven by
the spirit of political entrepreneurship, the SEC is driven by a sense
60. For a succinct history of blue sky laws, see Christopher R. Lane, Halting the March
Toward Preemption: Resolving Conflicts Between State and Federal Securities Regulators, 39 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 317, 321-23 (2005).
61. See, e.g., Di Trolio, supra note 59, at 1289-90 ("[B]lue-sky laws could easily be
evaded by disposing of securities out of state."); Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False
Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 23
(1998) ("[B]ecause state securities commissioners could not extend their authority across
state lines, state securities laws could not control two major waves of securities frauds,
which took place from 1917 to 1920 and in the late 1920s.").
62. Kozyris, supra note 53, at 520. Cf Painter, supra note 61, at 72 ("Securities fraud
law, by contrast, is determined by the geographic location of the transaction in question,
not by the incorporators' voluntary forum selection.").
63. See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352-c (McKinney 2006). For a recent application, see
State v. Clark McLeod, 2006 WL 1374014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2006).
64. See, e.g., Karmel, Federal and State, supra note 43, at 520 ("The case against Merrill
Lynch brought by the New York Attorney General was based on broad and general an-
tifraud provisions of the Martin Act.. . ."); John Cassidy, The Investigation: How Eliot Spitzer
Humbled Wall Street, NEW YORKER, Apr. 7, 2003, at 54 ("Spitzer's assault on Merrill Lynch
shocked the industry's official regulators almost as much as it shocked Wall Street.").
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of rivalry. Clearly, the SEC has been far more influenced by Eliot
Spitzer than Eliot Spitzer has by the SEC. In a real sense, Mr.
Spitzer has engineered a successful "hostile takeover" of the SEC,
hijacking its agenda and forcing the Commission to pursue his pre-
ferred approaches to capital market regulation, or else risk appear-
ing slow and indifferent and suffering a major public relations
defeat. Mr. Spitzer has replaced the SEC as "policy czar."6 5
To what extent Spitzer is motivated by "political entrepreneur-
ship" could be debated endlessly.6 6 The more important point to re-
member is that he is not alone-attorneys general in other states have
gotten into the act as well. 67 Whether this trend will last is questiona-
ble, although the issues it has raised cannot be conveniently ducked in
the hope that they will go away.
In sum, the incongruity in what states are doing is jarring. On the
one hand, the state corporate codes-mesmerized by contractarian-
ism, anemic fiduciary duties, and the internal affairs doctrine-pro-
vide too little investor protection. In marked contrast, attorneys
general have begun vigorously enforcing blue sky laws in a manner
that critics find too protective. 68 To boot, the lack of coordination
65. Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street in Turmoil: State-Federal Relations Post-Eliot Spitzer, 70
BROOK. L. REV. 117, 133 (2004) [hereinafter Macey, State-Federal Relations].
66. One journalist even observes that "analysts routinely refer to the nationwide attor-
neys general group as the National Association of Aspiring Governors." Brooke A. Masters,
States Flex Prosecutorial Muscle, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2005, at Al.
67. See, e.g., Marilyn Geewax, WorldCom Case Follows Trend of State Action, AuSTIN Am.-
STATESMAN, Aug. 29, 2003, at C1 (Oklahoma Attorney General); Masters, supra note 66
(Connecticut Attorney General). Interestingly, other state instrumentalities have tried to
get involved as well. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Call In The Feds. Uh, Maybe Not. N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 29, 2004, at § 3 p. 1 ("To critics, the failure to protect investors in Washington
State is Exhibit A for why state regulators should stay in the oversight mix. Indeed, the
debacle goes to the heart of the escalating battle between local and national officials over
who should police financial institutions."); Jeffrey Krasner & Andrew Caffrey, SEC Missed a
Chance at Its Probe of Putnam, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 16, 2003, at Al ("The investigations into
Putnam and other fund companies were led largely by state regulators, with the SEC weigh-
ing in afterward. Congress and state regulators have blasted the agency as an ineffectual
cop on the financial beat, and the new Putnam revelation is drawing more fire.").
68. David Ratner thus argues for the need to
clearly distinguish between state corporation laws, through which states compete
for the revenue of large national corporations by offering corporate managers the
highest level of protection against claims by shareholders (and which contain al-
most no provisions requiring disclosure to shareholders), and state securities laws,
which have been widely condemned by economists because they go far beyond
the disclosure requirements found in federal law and often give a state official the
authority to decide on the merits whether a particular security should be allowed to
be offered in the state.
David L. Ratner, The SEC at Sixty: A Reply to Professor Macey, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 1765, 1769
(1995).
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among state and federal regulators has occasionally led to chaos.69
Dual federalism, at least so far, has proven itself to be an ambivalent
mess.
B. Preemptive Federalism
Annoyed with the shortcomings of dual federalism, some com-
mentators have called for preempting state blue sky laws entirely.70
There is virtually no question, given the Commerce and Supremacy
Clauses, that Congress has the constitutional authority to do so. 71 I
argue, however, that preemptive federalism makes for bad policy for
two principal reasons. First, as federal regulation has grown and be-
come increasingly preemptive over the past decade, it has often de-
creased shareholder protections. Second, and more generally, federal
institutions simply lack the capacity to be the sole arbiters of securities
regulation.
1. Political Vagaries
While preemptive federalism might help shareholders, it also
runs the risk of further entrenching managers, depending on the po-
litical vagaries of the day. To begin with, federal oversight of corpo-
rate accounting-the root of many of the recent corporate scandals-
has been lax.72 More starkly, the recent triad of securities reform stat-
utes enacted from 1995 to 1998-the Private Securities Reform Litiga-
69. A notable example relates to the recent WorldCom debacle where Oklahoma
state authorities charged "the four leading witnesses in the federal criminal case ....
Those four witnesses whom pleaded guilty as part of cooperation deals with the govern-
ment and have admitted in court that they acted legally .... [sic] Now, those admissions
will be Exhibit A in the state criminal case against them." Barnaby J. Feder & Kurt
Eichenwald, A State Pursues WorldCom, Effects Seen on U.S. Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2003, at
Cl. Cf Fisch, New Federal Regulation, supra note 2, at 47 ("To the extent that federal stan-
dards intrude into traditional areas of state regulation, they may create confusion.").
70. See, e.g., Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky
Regulation, 10J. CORP. L. 553, 553 (1985) ("Today, blue sky laws are ineffective, philosoph-
ically unsound, and unnecessarily expensive, and they should be substantially
eliminated.").
71. Indeed, it would very likely be constitutional for the federal government to pre-
empt all of corporate law. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 32, at 26 ("No one seriously
doubts that Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause, especially as it is inter-
preted these days, to create a federal law of corporations if it chooses.").
72. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate
Law, 55 STAN. L. REv. 679, 744 (2002) ("[M]embers of Congress opposed by an overwhelm-
ing margin a proposal by the Financial Accounting Standards Board to require companies
to account for stock options as an expense-until, that is, a series of major financial scan-
dals changed the political calculus somewhat.").
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tion Act ("PSLRA") ,73 National Securities Market Improvements Act
("NSMIA"),74 and Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
("SLUSA") 75-all represent federal laws effectively meant to protect
managers from shareholder suits. 76 Shareholder protection has not
been high on the recent congressional agenda, 77 leading some schol-
ars to wonder whether blue sky laws such as the Martin Act might be
preempted next.7 8
Perhaps most amusingly, it is important to remember that while
corporate interest groups do clamor for "states' rights" when federal
laws do not suit them, they are also not ashamed to turn around and
argue for federal preemption in the face of inconvenient state laws. 79
73. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737.
PSLRA introduced, "inter alia, heightened pleading requirements for class actions alleging
fraud in the sale of national securities." Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251
F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir. 2001). See also Painter, supra note 61, at 32-34; A.C. Pritchard, Consti-
tutional Federalism, Individual Liberty, and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998,
78 WASH. U. L.Q. 435, 481-83 (2000) [hereinafter Pritchard, Constitutional Federalism].
74. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110
Stat. 3416. "The primary purpose of NSMIA was to preempt state 'Blue Sky' laws which
required issuers to register many securities with state authorities prior to marketing in the
state." Lander, 251 F.3d at 108. The securities exempted, called "covered securities," are
those nationally listed on the New York or American Stock Exchanges, or on NASDAQ. See
15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (2000). Note, however, that the "NSMIA expressly preserved state au-
thority to bring enforcement actions with respect to securities transactions." Di Trolio,
supra note 59, at 1295. See also Karmel, Douglas, supra note 35, at 91; Manning Gilbert
Warren III, Reflections on Dual Regulation of Securities: A Case for Reallocation of Regulatory
Responsibilities, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 497 (2000).
75. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112
Stat. 3227. SLUSA makes "federal court the exclusive venue for class actions alleging fraud
in the sale of certain covered securities and ... [mandates] that such class actions be
governed exclusively by federal law." Lander, 251 F.3d at 108. See also Jennifer O'Hare,
Preemption Under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act: If It Looks like a Securities Fraud
Claim and Acts like a Securities Fraud Claim, Is It a Securities Fraud Claim, 56 ALA. L. REv. 325
(2004); Pritchard, Constitutional Federalism, supra note 73, at 483-91. For a critique of
SLUSA, see Painter, supra note 61, at 9 ("To date, state law has not demonstrated signifi-
candy more bias in favor of plaintiffs than has federal law. The statistical evidence that
plaintiffs fled to state courts following the 1995 Reform Act is at best ambiguous.").
76. See, e.g., Bratton & McCahery, Equilibrium, supra note 14, at 51. Cf Marc 1. Stein-
berg, The Emergence of State Securities Laws: Partly Sunny Skies for Investors, 62 U. CIN. L. REv.
395 (1993).
77. Cf Painter, supra note 61, at 17 ("[P]assage of the 1995 Reform Act and the Uni-
form Standards Act suggests that shareholders might fare better if Congress continues to
stay away from corporate law.").
78. For instance,Jonathan Macey even predicts that Eliot Spitzer's activities "are likely
to lead to a congressional counterattack in the form of preemption of New York's Martin
Act" and concludes that the "capital markets will be weaker if this occurs." Jonathan R.
Macey, Positive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the Regulation of Corporate Governance:
The Coming Preemption of the Martin Act, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 951, 973 (2005).
79. As one newspaper article summarizes:
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The pattern is not limited to securities regulation: tort reform,80 drug
labeling, 8' consumer lending,82 and the deregulation of financial in-
stitutions83 and household movers84 provide just a few examples
where commercial interests have sought the federal government to
preempt state laws more favorable to consumers. Put simply, preemp-
tive federalism can too readily morph into "Deregulation through
Statutory Preemption. '85
2. Institutional Constraints
Even if we assume political vagaries away,86 preemptive federalism
suffers from serious institutional roadblocks: neither Congress, nor
the federal courts, nor even the SEC has the institutional capacity to
manage all securities regulation.
Securities are only one of a plethora of issues for Congress.8 7
From the Securities and Exchange Acts in 193388 and 193489 to SOX
Not surprisingly, as Mr. Spitzer and other state officials have grabbed headlines,
financial firms have protested their involvement. Sometimes quietly, sometimes
overtly, powerful financial institutions have lobbied hard in recent years to reduce
the purview and power of state regulators. They typically argue that the patch-
work of state and federal laws is inefficient and costly and that federal oversight
should take precedence.
Morgenson, supra note 67.
80. See, e.g., Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Federalism: Whatever Happened to Devolu-
tion?, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y Rev. 429, 447 (1996).
81. See, e.g., FDA, Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Pre-
scription Drug and Biological Products 38, Jan. 24, 2006, http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/
DOCKETS/98fr/00n-1269-nfr0001-01.pdf ("FDA believes that under existing preemption
principles, FDA approval of labeling under the act, whether it be in the old or new format,
preempts conflicting or contrary State law.").
82. See, e.g., Jonathan Peterson, Lenders Target State Laws: An Industry that Makes Home
Loans to People with Poor Credit Wants Uniform Federal Rules that Could Undo Tougher Consumer
Protections, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2005, at Al.
83. See, e.g., Helen A. Garten, Devolution and Deregulation: The Paradox of Financial Re-
form, 14 YALE L. & POL'v REv. 65, 96 (1996) ("WArhen states act to impose tighter restrictions
on their banks than those favored by the national sovereign, their choices may be more
responsive to public preferences than the deregulatory policies recently endorsed by the
Comptroller of the Currency. Financial deregulation may reflect elitist rather than
majoritarian values.").
84. See, e.g., David Rogers, Missouri Lawmaker Lends Movers a Hand, WALL ST. J., Nov.
30, 2005, at A4.
85. Karmel, Federal and State, supra note 43, at 507.
86. For a strong defense of preemption, see generally Prentice, supra note 39.
87. Cf Brett H. McDonnell, Two Cheers for Corporate Law Federalism, 30 J. CORP. L. 99,
124 (2004).
88. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000)).
89. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000)).
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in 2002, federal securities laws have consistently been reactive. Put
simply, Congress acts "on a fire patrol basis"90 where "the fire alarm is
a scandal or bad economic performance." 91 Assuming, arguendo, that
Congress would be able to act on an ongoing basis and with the best
of intentions to protect shareholders, it is unclear whether its drafting
of statutes would necessarily be to shareholders' benefit. Any federal
statute that seeks to be comprehensive will likely descend into com-
plexity in order to satisfy various interest groups.92
What about the federal courts? After all, led by the United States
Supreme Court, they have played an important historical role in fash-
ioning common law remedies, most famously through the federal
common law93 remedy of implied private rights of action for plaintiffs
alleging fraud or misrepresentation. These rights developed through
the early 1970s, 94 but more recent developments suggest that the fed-
eral courts are unlikely to be able to serve as the frontline in protect-
ing shareholder interests. Above and beyond heavy caseloads, there
has been a general movement, at least since the landmark United
States Supreme Court cases Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores95 and
Cort v. Ash,96 to cabin the federal common law of securities
regulation.9 7
90. Bratton & McCahery, Equilibrium, supra note 14, at 44.
91. Roe, Delaware's Politics, supra note 9, at 2530.
92. See, e.g., Kahan & Kamar, supra note 72, at 743-44 ("Like noncompeting states,
Congress would likely be amenable to lobbying by campaign contributors. As a result, it
would likely play to corporate managers, subject to occasional corrective legislation follow-
ing financial debacles."). As just one example, SLUSA has a careful carve-out for derivative
actions based on state fiduciary duty claims. See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 14, at 10.
This has no doubt made the Delaware bar happy. Whether it protects shareholders, how-
ever, is an entirely different matter. See supra Part I.A.1.
93. The term "federal common law" is used "to refer to any rule of federal law created
by a court (usually but not invariably a federal court) when the substance of that rule is not
clearly suggested by federal enactments-constitutional or congressional." Martha A. Field,
Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARv. L. REv. 881, 890 (1986) (footnote
omitted).
94. In the landmark case JI. Case Co. v. Borak, the Court implied a private right of
action under SEC Rule 14a-9 for false or misleading proxies. 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
95. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (limiting standing to
sue in private rights of action under 10b-5 to actual purchasers or sellers of securities).
96. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (creating a more restrictive test to determine
whether private rights of action may be implied under federal statutes).
97. As the Supreme Court cautioned in Santa Fe Industries v. Green, "[a]bsent a clear
indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of
the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities, particularly where estab-
lished state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden." 430 U.S. 462, 479
(1977). The retrenchment of federal common law has continued and is not limited to the
securities arena. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Kamen
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Given the limitations on Congress as a decision-making body and
on the federal courts as enforcers of securities law, perhaps the most
workable approach under a preemptive federalist model would be for
Congress to draft some broad mandates, then delegate expanded re-
sponsibilities to the SEC as its expert agency. This is possible and cer-
tainly more feasible than Congress trying to do things directly, but it
would vastly expand the Commission's duties and require a rethinking
of how the agency operates.98 After all, at least during the most recent
spate of corporate scandals, the SEC was often not a paragon of per-
formance.99 As one article in the Wall Street Journal rightly asks, " [h] ow
did the SEC's staff of more than 3,000 allow Mr. Spitzer's investor-
protection staff of 84 to grab the enforcement torch?" 100
To boot, given the ambiguities inherent in its enabling statutes,
the SEC has often found itself at the limits of the powers delegated to
it.1 1 Controversies related to Rule 14a-810 2 "precatory" shareholder
townhall meeting proposals,10 3 and Rule 19c-410 4 "one share, one
vote" rights'0 5 reflect the precariousness of its mandate in the realm of
v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 500 U.S. 90 (1991); O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994).
As one commentator has observed, the Supreme Court "altered dramatically the balance
between state and federal power during the 1990s: by restricting the federal common law
making powers of the federal courts." Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law, 76 B.U.
L. Riv. 895, 899 (1996). For a different perspective based on recent Supreme Court opin-
ions in the securities arena, see MarkJ. Loewenstein, The Supreme Court, Rule lOb-5 and the
Federalization of Corporate Law, 39 IND. L. REv. 17, 20 (2005) [hereinafter Loewenstein, Feder-
alization] ("[A] cynic might consider the new federalism cases to be an anomaly, with the
reality being that the Court is still as nationalistic in its approach as it traditionally has
been.").
98. An important component might be refashioning the SEC's power in criminal
cases. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 14, at 35 (noting how Eliot Spitzer was "visibly
on the ball while the Securities and Exchange Commission was asleep"); Alan R. Palmiter,
The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 AILA. L. REv. 879, 883
(1994) (lamenting "the SEC's erratic and desultory performance" in the context of Rule
14a-8).
100. Mark Maremont & Deborah Solomon, Behind SEC's Failings: Caution, Tight Budget,
'90s Exuberance, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2003, at Al. See alsoJesse Eisinger, SEC Screwdriver Joins
Spitzer Hammer as Hedge-Trimmer, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2004, at C1.
101. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46
VAND. L. REv. 1129, 1131 (1993) ("The statutory language and legislative history are ambig-
uous as to whether the SEC is authorized to enact rules with a substantive effect on corpo-
rate governance or simply to implement disclosure requirements.").
102. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2005).
103. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV.
L. REv. 833, 846 (2005).
104. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (2005).
105. The landmark case is Business Roundtable v. SEC, where the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals held that "[b]ecause the rule directly controls the substantive
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corporate governance. The regulatory tap-dance is perhaps most con-
torted when the SEC is relegated to exerting its influence indirectly by
having the stock exchanges implement what the Commission would
be precluded from doing directly.'0 6 As a former chairman of the
Agency somberly warns, "the SEC tiptoes in the corporate governance
area, with an omnipresent shadow of doubt surrounding the question
of breadth of the SEC's own mandate."10 7 With broader direction
from Congress, this problem might ameliorate, but it is unlikely to
disappear.
C. Stalemate
The responsibility for regulating the relationship between corpo-
rations and their shareholders has thus descended into a welter of
confusion. Neither dual federalism nor preemptive federalism has
proved satisfactory. 10 8 Little dialogue exists-even article titles have
become polarized. One commentator writes, "An Open Attack on the
Nonsense of Blue Sky Regulation";10 9 another, "The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance."' 10 Even before
reading further, one could be forgiven for being skeptical about ex-
isting paradigms for understanding the intersection of federalism and
securities regulation.
Interestingly, there has been no shortage of creative suggestions
to work around the problem. One commentator suggests that federal-
ism might be a red herring: "[C] ourts would be better off if instead of
invoking traditional notions of federalism in this area, they directly
confronted the substantive policy choices, such as that between mana-
gerial autonomy and investor protection, which are often disguised as
choices between federal and state law.""' Other scholars try to shift
allocation of powers among classes of shareholders, we find it in excess of the Commis-
sion's authority under § 19 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." 905 F.2d 406, 407
(D.C. Cir. 1990).
106. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements,
54 SMU L. REv. 325, 338-39 (2001) ("[S]tock exchange listing standards operate as a
bridge between state and federal law with respect to corporate governance, but their legal
status is uncertain.").
107. Richard C. Breeden, Giving It Away: Observations on the Role of the SEC in Corporate
Governance and Corporate Charity, 41 N.Y.L. ScH. L. Rv. 1179, 1182 (1997).
108. Cf Mashaw & Calsyn, supra note 42, at 316 ("But there seems no convincing way to
measure the comparative capacities of states and the federal government to pursue the
public interest.").
109. Campbell, supra note 70.
110. Romano, Quack Governance, supra note 3.
111. Alison Grey Anderson, The Meaning of Federalism: Interpreting the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 70 VA. L. REv. 813, 819-20 (1984). At the time Anderson was writing, the
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the analysis to new analytical categories: for example, between "spe-
cific" protections such as rules governing proxy solicitations, and
"catch-all" protections such as Rule 10b-5;1t2 or between mandatory
versus enabling rules. 113 Some observers-grasping tojustify preemp-
tive federalism as a deregulatory tool amid all the earlier talk among
laissez-faire's acolytes of devolving power to states-now couch their
deregulatory arguments in the rhetoric of "liberty" from government
intrusion. 14 Regardless of how one might view the merits of these
proposals, they sidestep the central issue of how to assess and pre-
scribe the relative roles of federal and state governments.
Rather than duck the federalism question, perhaps it can be re-
framed as a response to a second-best world with imperfect institu-
tions. 115 As Jill Fisch observes:
[T] he very dispersion of regulatory responses to the corporate gov-
ernance scandals offers a powerful reason to reject the search for
the ideal institution to anoint as the dominant regulator .... The
resulting regulatory competition offers valuable experimentation
and innovation with respect to potential regulatory solutions and,
ultimately, a powerful defense to the broad allocation of regulatory
authority among competing institutions such as Congress, the SEC,
the NYSE, and the states. 116
tension was between federal regulation and state deregulation. See id. at 814. Today, of
course, the situation might be reversed, with state attorneys general frequently being more
protective of investors than the SEC. See supra Part I.A.2.
112. See Dennis S. Kaijala, Federalism, Full Disclosure, and the National Markets in the Inter-
pretation of Federal Securities Law, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1473, 1476 (1986) ("[A]ppeals to the
general principles of federalism usually will not be helpful in interpreting the specific regu-
latory provisions of federal securities law, but that the federal interest in maintaining free
and honest national markets can and probably should play an important role in interpret-
ing and applying the catchall provisions.").
113. See Robert B. Ahdieh, From "Federalization" to "Mixed Governance" in Corporate Law: A
Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 BuFF. L. REv. 721, 737 (2005) ("What allows competition in
corporate law to be conceived as a 'federal' question, thus, is not the adoption of relevant
rules by national versus local authorities. Rather, it is the traditionally mandatory nature of
rules adopted under federal law, and the enabling nature of state corporate law.").
114. See, e.g., Pritchard, Constitutional Federalism, supra note 73, at 439-40 ("I conclude
that the Uniform Act [SLUSA] is consistent with principles of constitutional federalism
because its preemption results in less, rather than more, government interference with
private conduct .... [T]he Uniform Act enhances individual liberty because eliminating
state regulation enhances individuals' choices.").
115. On the importance of institutional analysis in welfare economics generally, see
Reza Dibadj, Weasel Numbers, 27 CARtDozo L. REv. 1325 (2006).
116. Jill E. Fisch, Institutional Competition to Regulate Corporations: A Comment on Macey, 55
CASE W. Rts. L. REv. 617, 625 (2005). See also Fisch, New Federal Regulation, supra note 2, at
47 ("Federalization may also reduce the responsiveness of state lawmakers in favor of leav-
ing the field to the federal government."); Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition,
Cooperation and Securities Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 122 (2004); Macey, State-Federal
Relations, supra note 65, at 139 ("To the extent that corporate and special interests have
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Notwithstanding this important point, current paradigms to get
beyond preemptive federalism either bring with them the laxity of
dual federalism, a lack of coordination, or both. Part II begins to
sketch out an alternative vision to foster the benefits of regulatory
competition while at the same time minimizing its downsides.
H. Cooperative Federalism
A. Overview
Ideally, we would like the best of both worlds: some kind of fed-
eral intervention to force states to address their inconsistencies, with-
out deploying the homogenizing tendencies of the vast federal
apparatus. The goal will be to find a middle ground between "'pre-
emptive federalism' that relies primarily or exclusively on federal
courts or administrative agencies to develop unitary and pinpointed
federal policies . .. [and] 'dual federalism' that leaves the states as
autonomous actors separated from the federal government."" t 7
The notion of cooperative federalism, drawn from new research
in the theory of economic regulation, provides at least a promising
beginning to addressing the conundrum. 118 The federal government
could create a framework and objective that states would implement
and possibly supplement. Philip Weiser, a leading commentator on
cooperative federalism in the regulatory arena, provides a compelling
description of the idea:
In contrast to dual federalism, cooperative federalism envisions a
sharing of regulatory authority between the federal government
and the states that allows states to regulate within a framework de-
lineated by federal law .... Significantly, these programs neither
leave state authority unconstrained within its domain, as would a
dual federalism program, nor displace such authority entirely with
a unitary federal program, as would a preemptive federalism ....
By crafting a middle ground solution between the extremes of dual
federalism and preemptive federalism, Congress continues to out-
captured the SEC, these groups will similarly favor preemption, since they have more con-
trol over the SEC than they do over a world in which the SEC and the states are locked in
competition for headlines, political support, and relevant targets to prosecute.").
117. Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of
the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1692, 1693 (2001) [hereinafter Weiser, Telecom Act].
118. New variations on cooperative federalism are emerging as well. See, e.g., Robert A.
Schapiro, Toward a Theoy of Interactive Federalism, 91 IowA L. REv. 243, 249 (2005) ("[A]
polyphonic conception recognizes an important role for competition among states and
between states and the federal government. The relationship of the states and the federal
government may indeed be confrontational rather than cooperative. Polyphony accepts a
substantial role for dissonance as well as harmony.").
[Vol. 40
FEDERALISM IN SECURITIES SYMPOSIUM
strip existing constitutional rhetoric, which envisions a separation
that does not exist in practice.11 9
While discussions of cooperative federalism have yet to occur in
securities regulation, the reasons behind its emergence in economic
regulation offer a striking parallel to the current problems in corpo-
rate and securities law:
Under the cooperative federalism model, certain choices are re-
moved from the state level to ensure that the state does not com-
promise-for whatever reason-on issues of national importance.
Thus cooperative federalism schemes define the terms of competi-
tion between the states so that they do not deviate from basic fed-
eral policy goals, underinvest in goods and services that would
benefit neighboring states, or engage in a "race to the bottom. 1 20
Cooperative federalism has been used in a variety of regulatory
contexts: environmental law, telecommunications, and social services,
to name a few.' 2 In their usual incarnation, cooperative federalism
programs "set forth some uniform federal standards-as embodied in
the statute, federal agency regulations, or both-but leave state agen-
cies with discretion to implement the federal law, supplement it with
more stringent standards, and, in some cases, receive an exemption
from federal requirements." 122 The bottom line is simple if one re-
119. Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79
N.C. L. REv. 663, 665-66 (2001) [hereinafter Weiser, Constitutional Architecture]. Cf
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy
Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty "Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REv. 813, 852 (1998) ("[I]t had never
been the case that the federal and state governments operated in 'separate and distinct
spheres' pursuing independent and distinct objects with distinct resources.").
120. Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications Reform, 52
VAND. L. REv. 1, 32-33 (1999) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Weiser, Chevron]. As Weiser
elaborates:
[T]here are at least three related reasons why the federal government has de-
cided to promote diversity in federal regulatory regimes: (1) to allow states to
tailor federal regulatory programs to local conditions; (2) to promote competi-
tion within a federal regulatory framework; and (3) to permit experimentation
with different approaches that may assist in determining an optimal regulatory
strategy.
Weiser, Telecom Act, supra note 117, at 1698. All of these reasons are eminently applicable to
securities regulation.
121. See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Account-
ingfor the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 552 (1999); Robert L. Fischman &
Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson for Conservation from Pollution Control Law: Cooperative Federalism
for Recovery Under the Endangered Species Act, 27 COLUM. J. EvrL. L. 45 (2002); Weiser, Chev-
ron, supra note 120.
122. Weiser, Telecom Act, supra note 117, at 1696. Cf Mashaw & Calsyn, supra note 42, at
312-13 ("First there is the centralizing move of creating a requirement at the federal level.
That condition or entitlement then empowers individuals within the state political process
either to participate more effectively in the processes of state collective decisionmaking or
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turns to first principles: set a minimum floor, and allow regulatory
competition above it.
B. Some Dimensions
At a broad level, then, the federal government would set minimal
shareholder protections, but leave implementation and the creation
of enhanced standards to the states. While the details of such a propo-
sal should be debated, the following thoughts serve as a starting point
for further discussion.
1. Fighting Fraud
The new securities regime should eschew merit regulation and
set disclosure and baseline antifraud standards at the federal level. At
the same time, however, it should leave implementation of these an-
tifraud standards-as well as the possibility of establishing higher an-
tifraud standards-largely to the states.
To begin with, merit review smacks of "command and control"
regulation that is long past its heyday in the world of economic regula-
tion. 123 It is unlikely that government officials will be able to passjudg-
ment accurately on the relative value of investments. 124 For their part,
disclosure parameters should be set once at the federal level, rather
than subjecting corporations to multiple state-by-state require-
ments. 125 There is likely enough disclosure qua disclosure 126-the
more important point is to ensure its accuracy. Moreover, having uni-
to avoid them entirely. Government moves away from and then back toward 'the
people."').
123. See, e.g., REZA DIBADJ, RESCUING REGULATION (forthcoming 2006).
124. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 70, at 563-67; WilliamJ. Carney, Jurisdictional Choice
in Securities Regulation, 41 VA.J. INT'L. L. 717, 721 (2001) [hereinafter Carney, Jurisdictional
Choice] (criticizing "the paternalism of 'merit' jurisdictions, which allow bureaucrats to de-
termine the worthiness of an investment-an extreme form of over regulation."). But see
Steinberg, supra note 76, at 411-12 ("Although merit regulation has been attacked for
being paternalistic and for increasing the costs of raising capital without generating coun-
tervailing benefits, its continued embracement by the states reflects their priority to foster
investor protection.").
125. Cf Skeel, supra note 46, at 475-76 ("I argue that lawmaking authority over corpo-
rate bankruptcy should be shifted back to the states .... Rather than relinquishing control
altogether, Congress should continue to regulate limited aspects of corporate bankruptcy,
such as the applicable disclosure requirements.").
126. Some scholars are even quite cynical about the value of the existing disclosure
regime. See, e.g., A. C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
1073, 1097-98 (2005) [hereinafter Pritchard, SEC at 70] ("Congress and the SEC focus
almost exclusively on disclosure because it reinforces the myths of investor autonomy and
sovereignty, a very lucrative myth as far as the financial services sector is concerned.").
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form disclosure requirements takes much of the air out of arguments
that a federalist system of securities regulation harms the interna-
tional competitiveness of American capital markets.1 27 Perhaps disclo-
sure might even be simplified.' 28
The focus, rather, should be on preventing fraud. 29 This effort
should coexist at two levels. First, a baseline level of protection articu-
lated by the federal government, but implemented largely by the
states. Second, an additional level of investor protection that states
could adopt voluntarily. It is important to recognize as a threshold
matter that some might argue the additional layer is unnecessary. Af-
ter all, "conduct that constitutes fraud under federal law is likely to
constitute fraud under state law, and vice versa."' 30 As one commenta-
tor observes, "[c]ontrary to the assertions of preemption advocates,
similar standards for fraud do exist across all securities regimes, state
and federal." 13 ' The real problem, then, might really be anemic en-
forcement, not divergent legal standards. 132 There is validity to this
point.
127. As one commentator suggests, "[e]limination of state registration requirements
would debase arguments that the states' securities laws impose regulatory barriers to capi-
tal formation, internationalization, and the facilitation of internet securities markets." War-
ren, supra note 74, at 508.
128. See, e.g., Carney, Jurisdictional Choice, supra note 124, at 723 ("The competitive
problem now facing U.S. markets is the reluctance of foreign issuers to comply with U.S.
GAAP as well as other burdens of our disclosure system, which has led to a relative dearth
of foreign listings in U.S. markets, and a plethora of such listings on the London Ex-
change."); Coates, supra note 11, at 533. It is important to remember, however, that disclo-
sure should not be simplified in a way conducive to fraud. Cf Painter, supra note 61, at
85-86 ("The 1933 Act registration and prospectus delivery requirements are riddled with
new exceptions, some of which have increased the opportunity for fraud.").
129. Interestingly, even scholars who suggest moving toward a voluntary disclosure re-
gime for offerings nonetheless advocate maintaining mandatory antifraud liability. See, e.g.,
Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1,
130 (1999) ("A critical adjunct to my proposal of disclosure choice is that issuers in public
offerings would be subject to a mandatory antifraud standard-namely, Rule 10b-5 liability.
Disclosure choice would shift compliance from ex ante line-item disclosure to ex post liability
standards.").
130. Painter, supra note 61, at 60-61.
131. Jones, supra note 116, at 127. See also id. at 129 ("The fact that the SEC joined
[New York Attorney General] Spitzer and [Massachusetts Secretary of State] Galvin in the
analyst and mutual fund investigations supports the proposition that the conduct targeted
by the states also breaches the federal securities laws.").
132. See, e.g., Geewax, supra note 67 ("We need more police on the beat for corporate
abuses and consumer rip-offs, not fewer investigations and actions." (quoting the legislative
counsel of a consumer advocacy group)); Masters, supra note 66 ("We are right on the
facts. This isn't new regulation. It's enforcement of existing statutes." (quoting Eliot
Spitzer)); Pritchard, SEC at 70, supra note 126, at 1080-81 ("[S]ome of the abuses that
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Nonetheless, some states might want to provide stronger invest-
ment protections. For example, antifraud claims are arguably easier to
bring under New York's Martin Act than under the federal statutes.13 3
And state blue sky laws can differ in how they treat private rights of
action, aider and abettor liability, statutes of limitations, and the
like.1 34 Such differences allow for healthy experimentation and have,
if nothing else, served as a vehicle to highlight gaps in the federal
regime.1 3 5 In fact, it is remarkable what state attorneys general have
been able to accomplish, given that their only effective power has
been ex post enforcement, not ex ante rulemaking.' 36
Thus, the central focus of the regulatory regime that I propose
uses both levels of government to prevent fraud. Focusing on the an-
tifraud aspects of the securities regime, rather than merit review or
more disclosure, will go a long way to enhancing investor confidence
in our capital markets.' 37
2. Public Enforcement and Private Rights of Action
There are of course two ways in which an antifraud mandate
might be pursued: first, via public enforcement and second, through
Congress has lately seen fit to regulate can be traced back not to a lack of regulation, but
rather to laxity in enforcement.").
133. See, e.g., Karmel, Federal and State, supra note 43, at 521 ("In the New York Attorney
General's view, in contrast to the requirements of the federal securities laws, no purchase
or sale of stock is required, nor are intent, reliance or damages required elements of a
violation [under the Martin Act].").
134. See Steinberg, supra note 76, at 418-27. See also Painter, supra note 61, at 71
("Some evidence suggests that state blue sky laws treat plaintiffs more favorably than does
the federal civil liability regime. Some states have weaker scienter requirements, and most
allow suits against aiders and abettors. A few states allow punitive damages for securities
fraud, and others allow for recovery of attorneys' fees."). For criticism of these differences,
see Campbell, supra note 70, at 575 ("[O]n balance, the state antifraud provisions should
be preempted in favor of the federal antifraud provisions, since it would, at least to some
degree, reduce the possibility of unnecessary regulation at the state level.").
135. See, e.g., Karmel, Federal and State, supra note 43, at 546 ("Since the problems are
national, and in some respects international in scope, an effective national regulator seems
more appropriate than piecemeal state regulation. On the other hand, aggressive state
action, such as the New York Attorney General's against Merrill Lynch, can highlight gaps
and problems with the federal regulatory scheme.").
136. Cf Macey, State-Federal Relations, supra note 65, at 129 (The New York Attorney
General's "only option, if it wants to engage in rulemaking or to otherwise affect basic
conduct or structure within the securities industry, is to do so through an enforcement
mechanism.").
137. See also Painter, supra note 61, at 76 ("[A] legal framework that protects investors
increases the size and breadth of a country's capital markets. Assuming Congress under-
stands this point, it is unlikely that it would risk diminishing the scope of the U.S. capital
markets by repealing laws against fraud.").
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private rights of action. I propose both, albeit with different
procedures.
To begin with, public enforcement by both federal and state offi-
cials is essential.' 38 Not only would some regulatory competition be
healthy, but states could play an especially important role in criminal
prosecutions, which serve as arguably the most important deterrent to
corporate miscreants.1 39 Whether they be civil or criminal cases, fed-
eral officials could bring suits in federal courts and state officials in
state courts.
Notwithstanding the advantages of engaging both federal and
state enforcement, better coordination is essential-one might even
argue that had state attorneys general simply informed federal offi-
cials of impending action, they would not have stirred nearly as much
controversy.' 40 Within a different model for federalism, John Coffee
has even suggested giving the SEC the power to enjoin actions by
states,14 ' but this would risk squelching healthy competition among
regulators. A better and less drastic approach would be to impose a
notification requirement on the states.1 42
Private rights of action, though controversial, 143 should serve as a
useful adjunct to public enforcement. 144 Here, though, I would pro-
pose a different institutional structure that is in many respects the mir-
ror image of SLUSA: leaving the implementation of private rights of
138. Indeed, the Martin Act does not even provide for private rights of action. See CPC
Int'l Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 514 N.E.2d 116, 119 (N.Y. 1987). See also Steinberg, supra note
76, at 419 ("New York declines to recognize a private right of action for violation of its
securities laws.").
139. See, e.g., Pritchard, SEC at 70, supra note 126, at 1098 ("The SEC's civil enforce-
ment powers look rather tame by comparison to hard time in a federal prison."). Yet, as
former SEC Commissioner Harvey Goldschmid explains "very few U.S. Attorneys were will-
ing to bring criminal securities cases, even in the most willful, hard-core areas."
Goldschmid, supra note 39, at 830.
140. Cf Cassidy, supra note 64 ("Eliot [Spitzer] didn't tell any other agency what he was
doing." (quoting SEC official)).
141. See John C. Coffee, Competitive Federalism: The Rise of the State Attorney General, 230
N.Y. LJ. 5 (Sept. 18, 2003) ("[T]he better answer is not to preempt all new initiatives by
the states, but to give the SEC authority to determine that a particular initiative or action
went too far and unduly burdened a national market system that ideally should be
uniform.").
142. For a similar proposal, see Lane, supra note 60, at 347 ("[T]he best solution re-
quires state authorities to notify and consult with federal regulators when there is any possi-
bility that their enforcement activities will impact the national market system or interfere
with ongoing federal investigations.").
143. See, e.g., Di Trolio, supra note 59, at 1311.
144. Cf Warren, supra note 74, at 499 (proposing "the adoption of corollary civil reme-
dies to ensure supportive private enforcement").
Summer 20061 FEDERALISM IN SECURITIES SYMPOSIUM
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
action exclusively to the state courts. Such a construct presents a num-
ber of advantages. First, it ensures a central role for state courts in a
new application of cooperative federalism-in contrast to conven-
tional conceptions of cooperative federalism that focus on the role of
state agencies as implementers. 145
Second, it would relieve the already overburdened federal courts
from the frontlines of policing corporations via securities regula-
tion. 146 Further, the boundary between state and federal antifraud
regulation is already fuzzy.' 47 Think, for example, of the saga in the
federal courts about whether or not to imply federal rights of ac-
tion. 14s Perhaps this debate could be sidestepped if private rights of
action were litigated exclusively in state courts. Indeed, as one ob-
server has suggested, maybe Congress did not include a private right
of action in the securities laws precisely because the federal statutes
were enacted against the backdrop of state securities laws that allowed
such lawsuits. 1 49
The confusion between the role of state and federal courts has
been further muddied by SOX. As Delaware Chancellors William
Chandler and Leo Strine point out,
Because the [SOX] Reforms address boardroom practices tradi-
tionally governed by state law but do not, in themselves, constitute
145. Supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text. Cf Schapiro, supra note 118, at 301
("The interrelationship of state and federal legislative and administrative mechanisms has
been noted in studies of 'cooperative federalism.' An important element of the polyphonic
conception is a recognition of the significant role of courts in realizing the promise of
federalism.").
146. But seejudith S. Kaye, Federalism Gone Wild, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1994, at A29 (not-
ing the significant burdens already on state courts).
147. See, e.g., Theresa A. Gabaldon, State Answers to Federal Questions: The Common Law of
Federal Securities Regulation, 20J. CORP. L. 155 (1994) (developing a taxonomy of different
ways in which the federal courts borrow from state law in securities cases); Karjala, supra
note 112, at 1473 ("because the federal scheme was adopted as an overlay on, and without
explicit preemption of, state securities and corporation law, problems concerning the loca-
tion of the boundary between federal and state securities regulation have been unavoida-
ble."). Cf Romano, Market Approach, supra note 15, at 2390 ("States can, however,
compensate for the problem of meager judicial precedents by formally incorporating fed-
eral court decisions interpreting the national laws, through either legislation or judicial
action, to the extent that the state's statutory language tracks the national laws.").
148. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Painter, supra note 61, at 79 ("Ironically, one reason the 1934 Congress
did not think to include this private right of action in the 1934 Act may have been because
Congress specifically preserved state causes of action in section 28 of the Act."); id. at 84
("By now preempting state causes of action, the Uniform Standards Act [SLUSA] leaves
investors with substantially less protection than they might have had if the Congresses of
1933 and 1934, and the courts since then, had known that the federal law would become
the sole remedy for securities fraud.").
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a comprehensive body of substantive corporation law, the Reforms
will inevitably begin to influence state law adjudication. One of the
important factors supporting this intuition is that Congress and the
Exchanges did not supply forums for the resolution of implemen-
tation disputes at the instance of stockholders. 150
Allowing state courts to hear securities cases would reduce ambi-
guity as to the role of the states in the implementation of SOX, not to
mention the welter of confusion that SLUSA has already engen-
dered. 51 In doing so, it would begin giving state courts a meaningful
role as venues for the adjudication of securities disputes.152
Third, having state courts adjudicate private rights of action does
not lock in the states to a national securities law regime, but only sets a
minimum federal floor. As this upsets the existing equilibrium, those
states that might be serious about offering greater investor protections
would be free to do so, provided they do not contract out of the fed-
eral statute.1 53 A related benefit is that allowing an interpretative role
for state courts allows state doctrine to evolve, thereby avoiding the
"vestigialization ' 154 of state law that accompanies preemption. David
150. William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American
Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U.
PA. L. REv. 953, 982 (2003). See also Karmel, Douglas, supra note 35, at 138 ("Since Sarbanes-
Oxley does not create new civil liabilities, with a few exceptions, failure to comply with its
provisions may result in state court actions.").
151. Jennifer O'Hare summarizes some of the problems:
[C]ourts have struggled with SLUSA's removal and preemption provisions. Some
courts hold that SLUSA applies only to cases expressly bringing a "fraud" claim,
and other courts find that SLUSA also applies to preempt claims grounded on
non-fraud theories of liability. Some courts look to the allegations actually made
in the complaint to determine whether SLUSA applies, while other courts look
beyond the allegations made in the complaint. Some cases permit plaintiffs to
plead around SLUSA, other cases do not. Moreover, most courts have had diffi-
culty in interpreting SLUSA's "in connection with" requirement.
O'Hare, supra note 75, at 368.
152. Currently, federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction under the 1934 Act. See 15
U.S.C. § 7 8aa (2000). There is concurrent jurisdiction under the 1933 Act, except for class
actions covered under SLUSA. See 15 U.S.C. § 77v (2000). Some commentators have pro-
posed expanding concurrent jurisdiction. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine, Rethinking Exclusive
FederalJurisdiction, 52 U. PrlT. L. REV. 383, 433 (1991) ("The federal antitrust and securities
laws are candidates for at least an experiment in concurrent jurisdiction.").
153. Cf McDonnell, supra note 87, at 139 ("Full-fledged nationalization [of corporate
law] would lose the gains from diversity and experimentation. Full-fledged devolution to
the states would eliminate the check on excessive managerialism that the various federal
actors provide.").
154. David Skeel uses the term in the bankruptcy context because it "refers to the fact
that after the separation of state corporate law and federal corporate bankruptcy, the inter-
action between these two areas of law is based upon the remnants of what might otherwise
have been a cohesive, integrated policy." Skeel, supra note 46, at 474 n.7.
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Skeel's critique of the existing bankruptcy regime applies well to se-
curities law:
The artificial separation of state corporate law and federal corpo-
rate bankruptcy has undermined both areas of the law. In the state
corporate law context, state lawmakers fail to consider fully insol-
vency-related issues because corporate bankruptcy is regulated by
Congress rather than the states; yet federal bankruptcy courts fre-
quently look to state law for guidance on precisely those corporate
governance issues where state law is likely to be inefficient or inap-
plicable. I refer to these perverse effects of the federalization of
corporate bankruptcy as a "vestigialization" problem.1 55
It goes without saying that a belief in devolving some power to the
states does not necessarily equate to laissez-faire economics' 56-again,
provided the federal government sets a mandatory minimum floor.
3. Transactions or Internal Affairs?
Despite a focus on fraud liability, a cooperative federalist model
will nonetheless raise issues about jurisdiction if not managed care-
fully. In particular, should states be able to exercise jurisdiction based
on the locus of the transaction as with existing blue sky laws, or should
jurisdiction rest on internal affairs?
Provided a minimum federal floor is maintained, enforcing the
antifraud laws in the state of incorporation would at first glance ap-
pear very attractive. It would simplify the administration of regula-
tion 157 and treat shareholders from different states uniformly. 158
155. Id. at 474-75. Cf Loewenstein, Federalization, supra note 97, at 49 ("[I] nterpreting
federal laws so as to displace state law inevitably results in the arrested development of state
law.").
156. The mantra among traditional law and economics commentators is to argue for
less government, not necessarily for states' rights if it does not suit their agenda. See supra
note 114 and accompanying text.
157. Cf Kozyris, supra note 53, at 510; Pinto, Takeover Statutes, supra note 45, at 490-91
("The use of the internal affairs doctrine in corporate law, under which a single rule of law
is selected, minimizes the problems of multiple state regulation.").
158. As Roberta Romano argues:
Fraud claims against an issuer should be uniformly adjudicated across inves-
tors .... Yet choice-of-law rules establish the application of one state's (the incor-
poration state's) standard to fiduciary duties in corporate law but leave the latter
decision on disclosure to vary with the investor's domicile, even though a duty of
full and fair disclosure is at the heart of the fiduciary duties of state corporate law.
Such intellectual incoherence concerning fiduciary conduct is the fallout of cur-
rent choice-of-law doctrine.
Romano, Market Approach, supra note 15, at 2404. Romano advocates "changing the current
choice-of-law rule for securities transactions from one that focuses on the site of the trans-
action to an issuer-based approach analogous to the internal affairs rule applied in corpo-
rate law." Id. at 2364. Needless to say, her proposal fits squarely within the dual federalist
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While elegant, such an approach does present a significant risk: given
the inextricable links between corporate law and securities laws, states
such as Delaware could potentially circumvent securities law claims by
effectively recasting arguments as corporate law claims.1 59
Yet, if state corporate law could be refrained to give greater teeth
to shareholder protection, resting jurisdiction on internal affairs
would make more sense. Indeed, I have proposed elsewhere a delayer-
ing of corporate law and a return to first principles of fiduciary law as
the foundation for a new minimalist architecture.1 60 One striking ad-
vantage of such an approach would be the possibility of treating cor-
porate and securities claims in a coordinated matter.1 61 But until such
corporate law reforms occur, basing jurisdiction for securities claims
on the locus of the transaction would allow states-notably New York
and California-to offer stronger protections. There will undoubtedly
be resistance to this idea, especially as relates to class actions-but
these protections are likely overblown for two reasons: first, state class
actions tend to be concentrated in the state where the defendant is
either headquartered or incorporated, 162 and second, small tweaks in
the federal statute-far short of complete preemption-could readily
address any residual concerns. 163
paradigm without a role for the federal government-except, somewhat ironically, to im-
pose issuer domicile as the choice of law for securities claims. See id. at 2402.
159. Cf Skeel, supra note 46, at 522 ("Because much of bankruptcy addresses third-
party issues of this sort, the internal affairs doctrine would not ensure the application of
the bankruptcy laws of the state of incorporation. Instead, a court would apply ordinary
conflict-of-laws principles to determine which state's law to apply.").
160. Specifically, I argue corporate law must match "standards of review" to "standards
of conduct," focus on the behavior of corporate officers, and vest exclusive jurisdiction to
litigate corporate claims in state courts. See Dibadj, Delayering Corporate Law, supra note 12,
at 470.
161. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, Some Problems with Stock Exchange-Based Regulation, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1509, 1515 n.36 (1997) ("If regulatory power is devolved upon states, the system of
securities regulation would have to be integrated with the system of corporation laws.");
Painter, supra note 61, at 65 (observing "the inherent connectedness of the law of corpo-
rate fiduciary duties and securities law, despite a longstanding effort by the federal courts
to separate the two.").
162. See, e.g., Painter, supra note 61, at 72-73.
163. See id. at 90 ("For example, Congress could have preempted class actions in states
where none of the following three connections exist: (1) The issuer is incorporated in the
state; (2) The issuer has its principal place of business or more than fifty percent of its
operations in the state; and (3) Twenty percent or more of the securities purchased or sold
by the issuer or other named defendants during the class period were purchased or sold
within the state.").
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C. Constitutional Dialogue
A cooperative federalist approach to securities regulation might
raise constitutional questions, including the creation of federal com-
mon law by state instrumentalities as well as possible non-delegation
and anti-commandeering concerns. 164 I argue, however, that such
concerns are misplaced.
The institutional approach I have proposed is one where the fed-
eral government would set minimum standards, but adjudication
would occur largely through state courts165 via a reverse-Erie principle,
as articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Testa v. Katt.166
Simply put, state courts have an obligation to enforce federal law. t 67
More specifically, United States Supreme Court precedent has repeat-
edly confirmed Congress' right to create a federal claim to be litigated
exclusively in state courts.' 68 Even Justice O'Connor's opinion in New
York v. United States,1 69 which held, under an anti-commandeering
principle, that "the Constitution simply does not give Congress the
authority to require the States to regulate,"' 70 nonetheless was very
careful to observe that: "Federal statutes enforceable in state courts
do, in a sense, direct state judges to enforce them, but this sort of federal
'direction' of state judges is mandated by the text of the Supremacy Clause. No
comparable constitutional provision authorizes Congress to command
state legislatures to legislate."17 1 One federal judge puts it succinctly:
164. See generally Lars Noah, Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts: Misplaced Metaphors in Ad-
ministrative Law, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1463 (2000).
165. The exception being, of course, enforcement actions brought by federal officials.
See supra Part II.B.2.
166. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
167. See id. at 389 ("For we cannot accept the basic premise on which the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that it has no more obligation to enforce a valid penal law of the
United States than it has to enforce a penal law of another state or a foreign country."). See
also HenryJ. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 383, 407 (1964) ('Just as federal courts now conform to state decisions on issues
properly for the states, state courts must conform to federal decisions in areas where Con-
gress, acting within powers granted to it, has manifested, be it ever so slightly, an intention
to that end.").
168. See Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635, 644 (2002); Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 385 (1996) ("[E]ven when exclusively federal
claims are at stake, there is no 'universal right to litigate a federal claim in a federal district
court.'" (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980)); Shoshone Mining Co. v.
Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 513 (1900) ("[T]he mere fact that a suit is an adverse suit authorized
by the statutes of Congress is not in and of itself sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Federal
courts.").
169. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
170. Id. at 178.
171. Id. at 178-79 (emphasis added).
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"No constitutional impediment prevents Congress from creating a
federal right that can only be vindicated in state courts."' 72
Beyond its overarching constitutionality, specific precedent exists
in another regulatory context for my approach. The Telephone Con-
sumer Protection Act of 1991,173 which authorizes a plaintiff to file
suit "if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a
State . . . in an appropriate court of that State,"'1 74 provides a useful
analogy. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
stated in upholding the statute, "We today reach the somewhat unu-
sual conclusion that state courts have exclusive jurisdiction over a
cause of action created by federal law.' 75 The court remarked that
"[b]ecause federal-question jurisdiction ultimately depends on an act
of Congress, the scope of the district courts' jurisdiction depends on
that congressional intent manifested in [sic] statute."' 76 My approach
should thus be plainly constitutional. 177
What if one were to go beyond my proposal and have state agen-
cies enforce federal securities laws? The question is a difficult one,178
172. William G. Bassler, The Federalization of Domestic Violence: An Exercise in Cooperative
Federalism or a Misallocation of Federal Judicial Resources, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 1139, 1186
(1996). Of course, state courts routinely adjudicate federal rights. See, e.g., Solimine, supra
note 152, at 413 ("Many theoretical or empirical discussions of parity focus on the adjudi-
cation of federal constitutional rights in state criminal cases.").
173. Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (1992).
174. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (3) (2000).
175. Int'l Sci. & Tech. Inst. v. Inacom Commc'ns, 106 F.3d 1146, 1150 (4th Cir. 1997).
The Second, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have agreed with the Fourth Circuit. See
Foxhall Realty Law Offices v. Telecomms Premium Servs., 156 F.3d 432 (2d Cir. 1998);
Erienet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, 156 F.3d 513 (3d Cir. 1998); Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta,
136 F.3d 1287 (l1th Cir. 1998); Chair King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507
(5th Cir. 1997).
176. Inacom, 106 F.3d at 1153-54.
177. Cf Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981)
("The most that can be said is that the Surface Mining Act establishes a program of cooper-
ative federalism that allows the States, within limits established by federal minimum stan-
dards, to enact and administer their own regulatory programs, structured to meet their
own particular needs.").
178. After all, as the Supreme Court noted in Printz v. United States, the Madisonian
Compromise of Article III § 1 and the Supremacy Clause apply only to courts. 521 U.S.
898, 907 (1997). It is thus "understandable why courts should have been viewed distinc-
tively in this regard; unlike legislatures and executives, they applied the law of other sover-
eigns all the time." Id. One commentator suggests reducing the complexities to the
canonical make/buy decision in transaction cost economics, essentially treating nonfederal
governments as private contractors:
The essence of this functional theory is an analogy between nonfederal govern-
ments-state, municipalities, counties, school districts, and so on-and private
organizations . . . . [T]he theory maintains that state and local governments
should have "autonomy"-that is, immunity from federal demands for regulatory
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and to be sure, there is tension in Supreme Court precedent on the
issue. 179 Nonetheless, it is quite likely even here the federal govern-
ment would have authority-provided the program is framed appro-
priately. There are several options that would likely pass constitutional
muster. The first would be to argue that the agency acts in a quasi-
judicial, rather than executive capacity.'t " Second, the program could
be attached to federal funding, in the form of a "conditional grant."18'
The third possibility is "conditional preemption" where "Congress en-
acts a general regulatory scheme, delegating implementation to the
states on the condition that the states submit an acceptable implemen-
tation plan to the federal government. '" 18 2 Even under this new hypo-
thetical scenario, then, cooperative federalism is very likely
constitutionally permissible.
Finally, and perhaps most excitingly, thinking about cooperative
federalism as it relates to securities regulation can offer a fresh per-
services . . . . Rather, the federal government should purchase such services
through a voluntary intergovernmental agreement.
Hills, supra note 119, at 816-17.
179. Compare, for example, FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 766 (1982) ("We recog-
nize, of course, that the choice put to the States-that of either abandoning regulation of
the field altogether or considering the federal standards-may be a difficult one."), with
Printz7, 521 U.S. at 907 ("[W]e do not think the early statutes imposing obligations on state
courts imply a power of Congress to impress the state executive into its service."). Indeed,
as the Printz Court itself continues, "[t]he Government points to a number of federal stat-
utes enacted within the past few decades that require the participation of state or local
officials in implementing federal regulatory schemes .... We of course do not address
these or other currently operative enactments that are not before us." Id. at 917-18.
180. See, e.g., FERC, 456 U.S. at 769 ("[T]he State is asked only to make its administra-
tive tribunals available for the vindication of federal as well as state-created rights"); Printz,
521 U.S. at 929. This raises the interesting question of whether state agencies should be
permitted to create federal common law. For differing viewpoints, compare Weiser, Consti-
tutional Architecture, supra note 119, at 719 ("[O]ur constitutional commitment to federal-
ism and effective governance justifies state agency administration of federal law not subject
to federal agency review."), with Reza Dibadj, Competitive Debacle in Local Telephony: Is the
1996 Telecommunications Act to Blame?, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 58-60 (2003). Cf AT&T v. Iowa
Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 385-86 n.10 (1999).
181. Where "Congress provides funds to the states on the condition that the state
spend the funds in accordance with federal priorities." Hills, supra note 119, at 859. See also
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166-67 (1992).
182. Hills, supra note 119, at 866. See also Printz, 521 U.S. at 929; New York, 505 U.S. at
167 ("[W] here Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce
Clause, we have recognized Congress' power to offer States the choice of regulating that
activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regula-
tion."); FERC, 456 U.S. at 771 ("If Congress can require a state administrative body to
consider proposed regulations as a condition to its continued involvement in a pre-
emptible field-and we hold today that it can-there is nothing unconstitutional about
Congress' requiring certain procedural minima as that body goes about undertaking its
tasks.").
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spective on federalism more broadly. The underlying, perhaps
counterintuitive, premise that state courts would be articulating fed-
eral common law' 83 can raise a number of exciting questions. One
issue would be how the federal statute should manage appeals. Obvi-
ously the United States Supreme Court would have the final say, at
least as to the first level of baseline federal protection, 18 4 but to what
extent should a federal appellate court have authority to review a state
court's decision? Will resistance develop to state court articulation of
federal common law?185 Might more complex forms of "multijurisdic-
tional" adjudication emerge?1 86 When state court procedures differ
from federal court procedures, 18 7 which should take precedence? 188
To what extent might congressional delegations to state actors be in
tension with Article II's mandate that the executive should "execute"
183. See, e.g., Field, supra note 93, at 890 n.30 ("Because federal common law applies in
state as well as federal court..., an argument that it should apply can be made in the first
instance in state court, just as in federal district court. In theory a state judge would recog-
nize federal common law if she believed the United States Supreme Court would recognize
it. And the contention that it is applicable would be reviewable by the United States Su-
preme Court, whether it prevailed below or not.").
184. Interestingly, recent empirical research suggests the Supreme Court is showing
declining interest in hearing business law cases. See E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert B.
Thompson, The Supreme Court and Private Law: The Vanishing Importance of Securities and Anti-
trust, 53 EMORY LJ. 1571 (2004) (noting how the United States Supreme Court is showing a
declining tendency to adjudicate private law disputes, notably in the securities regulation
and antitrust arenas).
185. For example, at least one commentator has questioned the proper geographical
boundaries pertaining to the creation of federal common law by state courts. See AnthonyJ.
Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 825, 869
(2005) ("The fact that a delegation of authority to make federal common law would be a
mandate to a state court to make law purporting to impose obligations throughout the jurisdic-
tion of the United States distinguishes such a delegation from the adoption by Congress of a
state law that a state voluntarily has made and that purports to impose obligations only
within the jurisdiction of the state.").
186. Different portions of a case could be reviewed in different court systems. Some
forms of multijurisdictional adjudication already exist; for example, federal certification of
state law questions or federal collateral review of state decisions through habeas corpus
petitions. Barry Friedman suggests greater cross-fertilization between state and federal
courts. See Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Fed-
eral and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1211 (2004).
187. See, e.g., Solimine, supra note 152, at 424-27 (outlining a series of possible proce-
dural differences).
188. Commentators diverge. For instance, compare Schapiro, supra note 118, at 303
("The limitations of Article III of the United States Constitution do not apply to state
courts. Accordingly, state courts can enforce the federal laws without the obstacle of fed-
eral standing requirements."), with Paul J. Katz, Comment, Standing in Good Stead: State
Courts, Federal Standing Doctrine, and Reverse-Erie Analysis, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1315, 1332
(2005) ("Federal standing limits should accompany federal causes of action because Con-
gress relies on these judge-made doctrines to frame its policymaking endeavors.").
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federal laws?18 9 Dialogue on these and other issues could help provide
a case study for constitutional controversies well beyond securities
regulation.
Conclusion
It is unlikely that Oscar Wilde was thinking about securities regu-
lation when he reminded us that "[w] e are all in the gutter, but some
of us are looking at the stars."'190 But his words are nonetheless appli-
cable. Neither defeatism nor effrontery is in order in the face of the
shortcomings of either dual or preemptive federalism. Rather, as
Judith Resnik notes, we should "aspire to a conversation within law
that relies less on preexisting categories and that searches among
evolving practices to learn something new about federalism in the
United States."' 9 '
This Article has been a first attempt to get beyond stale para-
digms. The approach I propose is one of cooperative federalism: the
federal government would impose minimum standards but allow indi-
vidualized implementation at the state level. Trying to create a new
architecture, rather than piecemeal reform, is challenging. Not to
mention that federalism is inherently a difficult subject. 192 Much work
lies ahead. My goal here has simply been a small step to a new conver-
sation about rethinking the balance between federalism and securities
regulation.
189. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997); Evan Caminker, The
Unitary Executive and State Administration of Federal Law, 45 U. KAN. L. R~v. 1075 (1997);
Weiser, Constitutional Architecture, supra note 119, at 707 ("Constructing a constitutional
architecture for cooperative federalism requires a new vision not only of federal-state rela-
tions, but also of the nature of separation of powers law.").
190. BARTLET-r's FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 566 (Justin Kaplan ed., Little, Brown, and Co.
1922) (1855) (quoting Oscar Wilde).
191. Judith Resnik, Federalism's Options, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 465, 473 (1996).
192. As the Supreme Court has observed, "the task of ascertaining the constitutional
line between federal and state power has given rise to many of the Court's most difficult
and celebrated cases." New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992).
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